Party insiders paint a picture of growing disconnect between the leadership and ground workers, a claim supported by electoral data. The AAP fielded just 37 of its 62 incumbent MLAs, with fresh candidates contesting in 33 constituencies. The results were telling: while 40.5% of incumbent MLAs retained their seats, only 21.2% of fresh candidates won — a dramatic decline from 2020 when AAP’s strike rate was 93% for incumbents and 86% for new candidates.
Of those that the party dropped, approximately 20 sitting MLAs were replaced with defectors from BJP and Congress — a move that left campaign workers disillusioned.
“AAP’s ticket distribution created discontent which prompted many party leaders to feel that loyal party workers were getting overlooked in favour of new faces, especially those they once called corrupt,” said a former MLA, speaking on condition of anonymity. The numbers support this assessment — even accounting for strategic moves like Manish Sisodia’s shift from Patparganj to Jangpura, the wholesale replacement of sitting MLAs appears to have backfired.
The party’s tendency to blame others for governance failures appears to have backfired. “People want solutions rather than excuses. They are not interested to understand the complexities of the governance structure,” admitted an AAP leader involved in campaign strategy.
The party consistently blamed the central government and neighbouring states for issues ranging from water supply to pollution.
During the campaign, one particular example of this was when ammonia levels rose in the Yamuna. Kejriwal accused the BJP-led Haryana government of “mixing poison” in Delhi’s water supply, comparing it to “biological weapons being used in war” between enemy nations. Even as the BJP demanded his campaign ban and Haryana threatened defamation suits, Kejriwal doubled down. “Go ahead, file a case. Is there anything left that you haven’t already done?” he responded, exemplifying the confrontational strategy.
On the ground, basic civic amenities deteriorated. While the party attempted last-minute fixes to bad roads, overflowing sewers, and contaminated water supply, the efforts proved too little, too late. “We wanted to fix the problems but the jailing of Arvind Kejriwal and other top leaders hindered our work. The officers did not provide the required support,” said a senior party functionary.
This civic apathy contributed to a broader erosion of trust. The party that emerged from an anti-corruption movement found itself struggling to maintain its clean image amid controversies over the chief minister’s residence renovation. “Arvind Kejriwal’s image as the common man was AAP’s hallmark,” said a party strategist. “The BJP’s campaign around the Sheesh Mahal controversy created a credibility gap that proved difficult to bridge.”
Multiple AAP leaders, speaking on condition of anonymity, also stated that there was a miscalculation in not allying with the Congress. One leader pointed out that the Congress, which AAP had dismissed as irrelevant with “just 4% vote share”, secured 6.34% of votes. In several constituencies, AAP’s margin of defeat matched the Congress vote count.
To be sure, data analysed by HT suggests arithmetic of a potential AAP-Congress alliance is more complex than simple vote addition suggests. If added mechanically, AAP and Congress account for 49.9% of the vote share in the most recent elections. But data from 42 of the 70 assembly constituencies released on Saturday shows AAP’s 2025 vote share alone exceeded what the AAP-Congress alliance secured in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. This indicates that a section of AAP’s voter base might be resistant to an alliance with Congress.
The data, and the comments from within its cadre, suggest the party fundamentally misread both its strengths and weaknesses.
